Embed with the Enemy?: War Correspondence as a Facet of Public Relations by 
[CONCEPT, Vol. XXXIV (2011)] 
Embed with the Enemy?: War Correspondence 
as a Facet of Public Relations 
 
Daniel E. Trucil 
Communication 
 
Since the dawn of recorded history, scholars estimate that over 3000 wars 
have been waged across this planet (Kohn, 2000).  In each, countless lives have 
been lost in pursuit of both victory and defeat.  Between 2004 and 2008, for 
example, the Iraqi government posits that close to 60 citizens died daily in the 
“War on Terror” (Antelava, “Who is counting,” 2009).  Over the course of this 
long and storied past, the face of modern war has shifted almost as frequently as 
the civilizations and technologies that sustain it.  So too have the central precepts 
of its portraying war to the public. 
Writing for a Chinese audience in 500 B.C.E., the famed philosopher-
general Sun Tzu summarized quite nicely the nexus between combat and 
communication.  As he suggests: “All warfare is based on deception.  Hence, when 
we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must 
appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far 
away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near” (500 BCE/2009, p. 
3).  Though describing military tactics in general, Tzu could just as easily have 
summarized the role of the contemporary war correspondent—the journalist who 
occupies that unique “danger zone” between the facts and fictions of war. 
War correspondents observe and report the execution and effects of conflict 
for an audience almost always not present at the combat scene.  Microcosmically, 
their stories are purportedly objective assessments of the “who, what, when, where, 
and why” of war.  More broadly, however, the trajectory of media relations in the 
theater of war offers compelling evidence that its content, construction, and 
dissemination deeply impact how conflict is “framed” for victims, victors, and 
viewers.  Approaching combat from a socio-historical perspective, this article 
examines critically the progressive development of war correspondence over time 
and the unique rise of “embed” reporting both before and during the crisis in Iraq.  
More specifically, I present contemporary theoretical critiques of combat reporting 
to suggest how the rise of embedding has elevated the framing and agenda setting 
capacities of the government, thereby robbing the news media of their essential 
regulatory function.   
 
  
War Correspondence: A History of Military Tension & Media Relations 
 
As Knightley (2004) has suggested in his thorough history of war 
correspondence, understanding the role of media relations in combat necessitates 
an appreciation for how that role has developed over time.  For Knightley, 
furthermore, this history is inexorably tied to the development of information 
technology.  Great Britain was the first country to utilize the war correspondent for 
sustained coverage of the Crimean War in the late 1850s (Knightly).  The 
increased efficiency of both continental travel and the postal service allowed 
British newspapers to send their own reporters directly into the war zone rather 
than “lifting” relevant stories from localized competitors (Knightley, p. 11).  In this 
early heyday of the English newspaper, journalism was guided at least in theory by 
a model of objectivity (Liebes & Kampf, 2009).  Liebes and Kampf describe how 
“the journalist [was] positioned only as a passive spectator…balancing between 
two (sometimes more) different views, present in public discourse.  This 
position…ensured the appearance of professionalism, allowing the journalist to 
keep a distance from the issue at hand” (p. 240).  Perhaps ironically, however, both 
national and international coverage of the American Civil War—less than ten years 
after the employment of correspondents at the Crimean front—was anything but 
objective and everything but “distance[d]” from the issues at hand.  Of the 500 
journalists sent to cover combat for pro-Union publications, for example, most 
produced stories rife with strategic ignorance, dishonesty, and a willingness to 
“dicker” with casualty figures (Knightly, p. 2). 
As early as the 1860s, therefore, the public relations undertones of 
correspondence were already influenced by an editorial need to produce news 
content both aligned with and supportive of a paper‟s combat stance/ideology.  
There was a sense that the press constructed news content to fit public opinion 
rather than allowing reader sentiment to coalesce through impartially descriptive 
text.  Not surprisingly, most contemporary scholarship engaging news content 
from the Civil War and Antebellum eras deconstructs a cautious but rampant 
editorial bias on either side of the Mason-Dixon line.  Cronin (2009), for example, 
analyzed Southern press treatment of major moments throughout Lincoln‟s 
presidency to determine the level of objectivity with which each assessed the 
Union leader.  Her survey of such coverage suggests that Southern editors either 
ignored Lincoln or were cautiously critical of his influence prior to the election of 
1860, after which there was a liberal manipulation of facts to suit the needs of the 
burgeoning Confederacy.  At least in part, such assessments are surprising in their 
recognition of public relations as a practice well before its establishment as a 
legitimate field/profession in the early 1900s.  Reporters, editors, and even the 
 military were keenly aware that mediated messaging could, at the very least, 
sustain public sentiment.    
With the Spanish-American War came the rise of  “yellow journalism” and 
the dawn of a new journalistic phenomenon in the field of war reporting: 
censorship.  Knightly (2004) describes how “correspondents worked under harsh 
and repressive censorship.  One censor used to throw correspondents‟ dispatches 
straight into the wastepaper bin without bothering to read them” (p. 77).  Resultant 
from such practices, journalists tempered objectivity to reflect the growing 
functionality of the media industry (Knightly, p. 77).  Scholars and professionals 
recognized that journalists could interpret and factually report the news without 
remaining detached while government officials grappled with the public right to 
freedom of information and the private need to spin news to their advantage. 
By the start of World War II, martial and governmental establishments had 
capitalized on the public relations influence of mediated messaging through the 
“strategic management” of war coverage (Knightley, 2004, p. 76).  They 
acknowledged that traditional censorship blocked the production of a particular 
story or perspective, but it did little to promote the establishment‟s official stance.  
By the 1940s, therefore, American military officials ingeniously transitioned from 
ad hoc post-production censorship to the more subversive, public relations-based 
“source” censorship:  “Within the United States, the army and the navy…tried to 
prevent correspondents from learning anything they did not want them to know.  
The criterion was: „Is it a good thing for the army (or the navy) to have this 
information made public?‟” (p. 300).  From the government perspective, war 
correspondence became an implicit facet of military-media relations, and 
journalists were all too eager to sacrifice traditional objectivity for immediate (if 
limited) access to formerly classified information. 
The absence of a critical gaze, however, was amended following the United 
States‟ involvement in Vietnam.  By the late 1960s and early 1970s, television had 
become the central focus of the mass media industry (Knightley, 2004).  As Liebes 
and Kampf (2009) explain, with the rise of TV and the increasingly vocal dissent 
to American intervention in Southeast Asia came a new form of war 
correspondence: 
 
Whereas the move from objectivity to social involvement developed in the 
era in which journalism‟s main home was the printed press, the gradual but 
unstoppable move to television had a massive impact on the profession in 
other directions.  It did not take long for journalists to understand that the 
order of the day ha[d] become authenticity, live action, and drama, all of 
which have contributed to create a new model, one that we entitle 
“performance journalism.” (p. 241) 
  
Viewed from this perspective, the public relations capacity of war correspondence 
was troubling not only because it directed the ebb and flow of information 
transmission but also because it bowdlerized the otherwise necessary critique 
provided by the media as a social watchdog. 
Vietnam taught the American establishment a great deal about the 
importance of media control.  Both journalists and readers/viewers voiced their 
willingness to turn a critical eye towards the execution of martial tactics at home 
and overseas (Cortell, Eisinger, & Althaus, 2009).  Of particular importance to the 
public relations practitioner, however, government officials now recognized that 
both camps were equally willing to accept information as delivered by the 
establishment, and that working with the media rather than against might actually 
prove beneficial (Cortell et al.).  Partly a social experiment and partly a response to 
critiques of the handling of Vietnam, the American military thus developed the 
“media pool” system as the foremost method for disseminating and controlling 
information in times of war.   
As defined by Knightley (2004), “pooling” was a correspondence tactic 
wherein a limited number of reporters were granted access to the war zone and 
permitted to travel in “pools, escorted by military officers to cover various stages 
of the action as chosen by the military” (p. 490).  In his contextual assessment of 
“new” war journalism, Nohrstedt (2009) has explained how media pooling during 
the First Gulf War “was perfectly adapted to the goal of the PR strategy of 
portraying one‟s own side‟s fighting as „civilized,‟ unlike that of the 
opposition…[P]ublic affairs officers made a conscious effort to spread the image 
of a high-tech war without innocent victims” (p. 97).  Though by now public 
relations was recognized by name, military personnel crafted PR as an ingeniously 
elaborate veil to hide government influence behind a veil of journalistic integrity.  
Messaging remained both regulated and controlled by a central governing body, 
yet now it was disguised and endorsed by a purportedly credible intermediary—
namely, the media.  Gardner (2007), for example, synthesized the Pentagon‟s 
approach to “sustain[ing] its war narrative through control of media access” to 
examine chronologically the ramifications of the media pool system.  As he has 
observed, of the six major combat efforts involving the United States between 
1987 and 2001, pool reporters were strategically detained wherever and whenever 
access threatened the military establishment.  As a popular t-shirt for such 
correspondents ironically observed: “When there‟s News…We‟re in the Pool” 
(Gardner, p. 112). 
 The media pool system sufficiently served the needs of the military, yet it 
left much to be desired from actual coverage.  Citing Carey (1995), Stauber and 
Rampton (1995) describe how  
  
[PR] propaganda [must] play…a more covert and sophisticated role in 
technologically advanced democratic societies, where the maintenance of the 
existing power and privileges are vulnerable to popular opinion.”…The 
latter half of the twentieth century has been marked by growing 
disillusionment as the American people have learned of the gulf that 
separates official rhetoric from…actual conduct. (pp. 148-154)   
 
Attempting to balance both message control and freedom of the press, therefore, it 
was ironically the second Bush administration that developed a program 
reconciling these seemingly disparate public interests (Nohrstedt, 2009).  Their 
solution: embedding correspondents with troop details.   
 
Sleeping with Our Subjects: Embedding as the “New” Media Relations 
 
As Cortell et al. (2009) explain, the Department of Defense (2003) defines 
media embeds as those journalists who “live, work, and travel as part of the units 
with which they are embedded to facilitate maximum, in-depth coverage of U.S. 
forces in combat and related operations” (p. 669).  Whereas the media pooling 
system strictly controlled the type of news content journalists could access, the 
embed program offered correspondents purportedly free reign.  Journalists were 
censored only with regard to so called “not releasable” information—nineteen 
items related to troop movements and locations designated classified for security 
purposes (Cortell et al., p. 669). 
While embedding is a relatively new technique, the practice has nonetheless 
gained widespread social and scholarly attention—particularly as related to its use 
in America‟s ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In their analysis of 
embedding in Iraq as a form of performance journalism, Liebes and Kampf (2009) 
have contextualized the Bush administration‟s controversial decision to utilize 
embedding against the backdrop of war correspondent history.  Reifying 
Knightley‟s (2004) hypothesis that journalism in general is a product of social and 
technological progress, Liebes and Kampf stress how embedding was the unique 
result of (1) advances in the methods of war reporting, (2) a shift from national 
public broadcasting to international commercial media conglomeration that 
emphasized ratings over quality, and (3) the governmental transition from public 
affairs censorship to public relations collaboration (see also Cortell et al., 2009; 
Herber & Filak, 2007). Bush advisors (many of whom were employed by the 
President‟s father in the mid- and late-1990s) learned from their mistakes in the 
First Gulf War and saw the mounting conflict in Afghanistan as a PR opening for 
“new strategies” towards media-military relations (Cortell et al., p. 661; Herber & 
 Filak, 2007, pp. 38-39).  From a public relations perspective, embedding would 
afford military officials the same control and functionality they enjoyed using 
censorship/media pooling while offering journalists the opportunity to record 
coverage from behind enemy lines.  
Observed broadly, scholarly assessments of the embed process and the War 
on Terror have (1) scrutinized the usefulness and efficacy of “new” war journalism 
and (2) attempted to assess the benefits and consequences of such reporting tactics.  
Fahmy and Johnson (2005), for example, surveyed reporters embedded in Iraq to 
assess their satisfaction with working conditions under the new correspondence 
policy.  Most correspondents were pleased with the coverage produced and praised 
the program for affording them the opportunity to observe and catalogue conflict 
directly. For them, embedding was a useful practice that allowed for access largely 
free from direct censorship, promoted first-hand accounts of conflict in real time, 
allowed for the media to self-correct discrepancies in official war messaging, and 
offered previously unknown insight through daily interaction with frontline 
officials.  
At the same time, however, the authors‟ assessments of the journalism 
produced by such correspondents suggests that embeds over-emphasized the 
weakness of Iraqi infrastructure and the relative ease with which American troops 
negotiated enemy surrenders (Fahmy & Johnson, 2005).  Non-embeds (“unilateral” 
journalists stationed in Iraq though not officially sanctioned or protected by 
military personnel), on the other hand, were far more likely to publish stories 
detailing civilian anger with American occupation, the negative impacts of foreign 
occupation, and both civilian and combatant casualties.  When confronted with 
these differences, furthermore, most embeds affirmed their overall positivity 
towards new media tactics.  For them, integration into military units did not 
compromise journalistic objectivity since the ethical obligations of individual 
reporters would prevail over systematic control. 
Lindner‟s (2009) content analysis of some 742 print articles published by 
156 national and international reporters yields similar results.  Lindner compared 
the coverage produced by embeds with that of Iraqi nationals and rogue 
“freelance” reporters who traveled to Iraq of their own accord.  Overall, embeds 
produced more coverage of actual combat, utilized military officials more 
frequently as content sources, and fused treatment of the two in human interest 
stories on soldiers stationed in the Middle East.  Those covering the War on Terror 
for Iraqi outlets, on the other hand, were far more likely to publish stories on 
bombings (both suicide and American), infrastructure damage promulgated by 
sustained martial occupation, civilian deaths, and human interest stories on fellow 
Iraqis‟ struggles with the US presence in their country.  Not surprisingly, Lindner 
found that independent journalists evidenced the most balanced coverage of stories 
 from the Persian Gulf, tempering positive assessments of martial intervention with 
critical analyses of the long-term ramifications of the Bush administration‟s 
decision to invade.   
Such observations are telling for what Knightley (2004) perceived as the 
willing deterrence of reporting “from the other side” prompted by embedding 
tactics (p. 539).  Lindner (2009), in fact, has suggested that embed reporters suffer 
from a journalistic Stockholm syndrome since they rely on American military 
personnel for “transportation, health care, and supplies” (p. 23).  In light of such 
considerations, Fahmy and Johnson (2005) posit that while embedding does 
tremendous good in the short-term, overtime it (1) curtails the maximum freedom 
to report, (2) conspicuously circumvents objectivity, (3) proffers a strictly 
American perspective bordering on Pentagon spin, and (4) suggests the inaccurate 
absence of combat thanks to advances in military technology.  In short, embedding 
is well suited to the PR needs of the military but its critical perspective is one-sided 
(read: American) at best (Gardner, 2008, p. 114; Nohrstedt, 2009). 
In a related vein, Lewis and Reese (2009; see also Reese & Lewis, 2009) 
conducted interviews with American journalists from USA Today to examine the 
semantics of the phrase “War on Terror.”  Their interactions with correspondents 
suggest not only that the news media use this title as a space-saving ideological 
symbol but also that such framing was both known and endorsed by those who 
adopted it at the implicit urging of the Bush administration‟s PR machinery (see 
also DiMaggio, 2009; Herber & Filak, 2007).  Such findings were corroborated by 
Vultee‟s (2009) content analysis of US newspaper articles that used the term “War 
on Terror” between 2001 and 2006.  Studies as late as 2008, in fact, have 
suggested that less than ten percent of news sources utilized in 2003 could be 
classified as “anti-war,” and that the framing of the Iraqi conflict by purportedly 
conservative (Fox) and liberal (CNN) outlets alike were nonetheless pro-war in 
overall positioning (though perhaps not to the same extremes) (Johansen & 
Josslyn, 2008).   
Attempting to determine whether increased education counteracts the 
negative influence of such “lopsided” news coverage, Johansen and Josslyn (2008) 
surveyed American citizens on their academic backgrounds and the accuracy of 
their understanding of the war in Iraq.  To their surprise, educated viewers of 
traditionally biased outlets such as CBS and Fox were just as likely to be 
misinformed about the War on Terror as their uneducated counterparts.  As the 
authors succinctly observe:  “Ideally, news media act as a filter, sifting and sorting 
information in a manner that ensures a reliable and accurate source from which 
citizens can base judgments about war.  [As of late, t]he news media fell far short 
of this ideal and exacerbated the spread of misinformation” (p. 591).   
 
 From Practice to Theory:  
Unpacking the Consequences of War Correspondence 
 
Knightley (2004), among others, has suggested that the history of war 
correspondence is a product of our need for information and the development of 
technology that allows for its pursuit.  Beyond mere chronology, however, the 
development of the war correspondence craft has offered social scientists a lens 
through which to view the public relations consequences of news content.  As the 
aforementioned studies have suggested, understanding the “what” of war 
correspondence history is just as compelling (if not more so) than the “why” and 
“how” constitutive of its larger social importance.  Developed in the late 1970s and 
expanded over time, the theories of agenda setting and journalistic framing 
illuminate not only how news is crafted but also what that crafting says and does to 
the viewing and reading public. 
In their seminal text from 1972, McCombs and Shaw have suggested that 
“[t]he world is reproduced imperfectly by individual news media” (p. 177).  This is 
the central axiom behind their agenda setting theory.  As defined by its designers, 
agenda setting rests on Cohen‟s (1963) precept that “the press „may not be 
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly 
successful in telling its readers what to think about‟” (McCombs & Shaw, p. 177, 
citing Cohen, p. 13).  McCombs and Shaw explain how “[i]n choosing and 
displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part 
in shaping political reality.  Readers learn not only about a given issue, but also 
how much importance to attach to that issue from [its positioning and the] amount 
of information in a news story” (p. 176).  The agenda setting premise is 
disconcerting principally because it suggests that news construction, by its very 
nature, circumvents the ideals of objectivity that have long been staples of 
journalism.  
As initially envisioned by McCombs and Shaw (1972), agenda setting theory 
was a means for explaining disparities between reality and reality perception 
among American voters.  Nonetheless, its implications for the study of war 
correspondence have gained increased notoriety since the end of the Vietnam War, 
particularly as regards a subset of agenda setting scholarship known as “issue 
framing” (Hiebert, 2003).  As defined by Herber and Filak (2007), “framing” is the 
journalistic ability to select some aspect of a perceived reality and to make them 
more salient in a communicative text.  Like agenda setting, it represents a “subtle 
emphasis on an issue‟s various aspects, thus making these details more important” 
(Herber & Filak, p. 42).  More specifically, however, framing theory assumes that 
the journalist‟s structuring of sources, details, and data within a story coalesce to 
contextualize the reporting from a particular point of view.  Lewis and Reese 
 (2009) describe how “frames define the terms of debate; shape public opinion 
through persuasive use of symbols; and, when most effective, lead to public policy 
change.  They are tools used by social actors to structure reality, and their creation 
and manipulation are often managed by elites seeking to reinforce their discursive 
dominance” (pp. 85-87).  More recently, scholarship has attempted to deconstruct 
the mechanics of conflict framing, most especially in light of the increased 
polarization of media coverage throughout the United States. 
In a study conducted by Blondheim and Shifman (2009), for example, 
Israeli, Hamas, and international news coverage of the December 2008 crisis in the 
Gaza strip was compared to assess differences in reporting styles for combat 
opponents.  Blondheim and Shifman determined that the nature of correspondence 
was directly related to three “arenas” of war reporting: the home front, the enemy 
frontlines, and the outside world.  In home coverage, both Hamas and Israeli 
publications emphasized the “official” stance of power proffered by their 
governments.  Whereas Israeli officials attempted to extend this image into 
coverage in Hamas-controlled territory, however, journalists instead highlighted 
Israeli vulnerability.  Similar failures were found in the Israeli desire to appear 
vulnerable abroad; here, journalists were far more likely to emphasize the power of 
Israel, most especially when tied to allies.  Hamas coverage suffered from similar 
strengths and weaknesses.  Journalists from the home front supported power 
scripts, but violence and disaster, respectively, were the framing images in Israel 
and abroad.   
Overall, the Blondheim-Shifman (2009) assessment is compelling evidence 
that the willing acceptance of official war positioning by domestic correspondents 
may undermine the critical nature of national news.  As Lindner (2009) has 
suggested, reporter tactics routinely homogenize coverage; when these “gathering 
tactics” are directly correlated with governmental messaging (as is the case with 
embedding) it becomes more and more challenging to evaluate the system from 
within. 
 
Conclusion: Should All War Be Deception? 
 
From a public relations perspective, the exponential growth of embed 
correspondence is both a blessing and a curse.  It affirms the value of 
communication tactics in relationship cultivation—an integral objective of any 
public relations plan—but it also suggests that PR strategies themselves undermine 
the value and validity of our national news coverage.  The success of promotional 
public relations for the War on Terror has been mixed at best and misrepresented at 
worst.  Viewed through the lens of scholarly critique, however, the depth and 
breadth of studies reported here suggest that new developments in media relations 
 policy have real and concrete consequences for audiences both at home and 
abroad.  In a crisis situation, strategic public relations can do tremendous good for 
reputational maintenance and mediated messaging.  At the other extreme, however, 
the potential to abuse information channels is a real and present danger.  Stauber 
and Rampton (1995), for example, remind their readers that one of the most highly 
paid consultants for the fledgling Nazi government was none other than Ivy Lee—
the venerated father of American strategic communication.  More recently, White 
House executives have acknowledged that “[most] people still get their news from 
their local papers”; when such coverage is fatally flawed at the source, however, 
how can a national public be fully and impartially informed (“White House trying 
new,” 2003)?   
While the socio-historical assessment here presented is neither positive nor 
negative in its outlook, it is an acknowledgment that embed reporting has “come 
from somewhere” and must, in turn, grow and develop beyond its present state.  
Though Sun Tzu‟s assertion that “[a]ll war is based on deception” may not be far 
from truth, therefore, perhaps it is deception itself that has changed.  Modern war 
correspondence is more open and accessible than ever before, yet its purview 
hardly reflects such freedom—possibly because truth is subjective, or possibly 
because “the Third World War has already begun—but thanks to public relations, 
it simply hasn‟t been announced” (Stauber & Rampton, 1995, p. 178). 
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